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December 1966] Recent Developments 
CONTRACTS-Expanded Application of Promissory 
Estoppel in Restatement of Contracts Section 90 
-Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.* 
351 
Plaintiff sought a franchise for a Red Owl supermarket and was 
told by an agent of the defendant that $18,000 would be sufficient 
to finance such a venture.1 Acting on the advice of the agent, plain-
tiff purchased a small grocery store so that he could gain experience 
in food store management. Having been assured that "there would 
be no problems in establishing him in a bigger operation,"2 plain-
tiff sold this store after three months of doing business and realized 
a net profit of approximately $500 on the purchase and sale. In 
further preparing for the franchise, plaintiff sold a bakery which 
he and his wife had operated for five years,3 secured an option to 
purchase land for the proposed supermarketl and rented a home 
close to the proposed site. Subsequently the defendant insisted that 
plaintiff make an initial investment of $34,000-a substantial in-
crease from the $18,000 figure originally quoted. The plaintiff termi-
nated negotiations and brought suit to recover the damages he had 
sustained in reliance on the defendant's representations. The trial 
court awarded the plaintiff damages for the loss on the sale of his 
bakery, his rental and moving expenses, and the cost of the land 
option. Plaintiff's claims for losses resulting from the sale of the 
• 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. Since the defendant was located and incorporated in Minnesota, its negotiations 
with the plaintiff in Wisconsin were conducted by various representatives. There 
being nothing in the case to suggest that the agents exceeded their authority, no 
mention will be made of the agency relationships. 
2. Principal case at 688, 133 N.W.2d at 269. 
3. The defendant's agent told plaintiff and his wife that "they would have to 
sell tlieir bakery busineu and bakery building, and that their retaining this 
property was the only 'hitch' in the entire plan." Principal case at 688, 133 N.W.2d 
at 270. 
4. The option was taken after the defendant's agents represented that everything 
was all set. Principal case at 688, 133 N.W.2d at 270. The presence of such unequivocal 
statements in the principal case, see notes 2 Be 3 supra and accompanying text, was 
important in establishing that plaintiff's reliance was reasonable and foreseeable. 
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grocery store were allowed in part, for the court permitted recovery 
of the difference between the sales price and the market value of 
the store, but refused to award future profits. The Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin, endorsing for the first time the principle of promis-
sory estoppel incorporated in section 90 of the Restatement of Con-
tracts, held, affirmed. Notwithstanding its conclusion that the de-
fendant had acted in good faith, that is, defendant's original repre-
sentations had not been made with an intent not to perform, the 
court found the plaintiff's reasonable and foreseeable reliance on 
defendant's representations was of such a nature that injustice could 
be avoided only by protecting that reliance interest. 
The protection of reliance interests is not a modern concept; it is 
substantially coincident with the old action of assumpsit which pro-
vided for the enforcement of promises in order to avoid injury to 
a promisee.5 However, as consideration evolved as the basis of con-
tract law, the emphasis placed on the bargain aspects of agreements 
relegated concern with reliance interests to secondary importance. 
Only in those cases in which a plaintiff had relied, with justification, 
to his detriment on a promise for which consideration was lacking, 
would the courts protect his reliance by enforcing the promise. 6 
However, by the 1920's a sufficient body of case law existed to war-
rant recognition of promissory estoppel in section 90 of the Restate• 
ment of Contracts. That section provided: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
duce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character 
on the part of the Rromisee and which does induce such action or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise.7 
Ironically, the inclusion of section 90 in the Restatement inhibited 
the further development of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. No 
explanatory comments accompanied the provision and no theory of 
damages was suggested for use in conjunction with section 90. The 
lack of attention to remedies led the courts, and many commentators, 
to conclude that only full contract damages were appropriate in cases 
in which promissory estoppel was invoked. Unfortunately, those who 
so concluded could find considerable support for their position.8 
First, in the Restatement's extensive treatment of damages, it is 
nowhere suggested that contracts resulting from promises enforced 
under section 90 require special handling. 9 Second, it is apparent 
5. Aines, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L REv. I, 15 (1888). 
6. IA CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 206-07 (1963). 
7. For a thorough discussion of promiswry estoppel and its incorporation in 
§ 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, see Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements 
and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1950). 
8. See 59 DICK. L. REv. 163 (1955); 13 VAND. L. REv. 705 (1960). 
9. Rl!sTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 327-46 (1932). 
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that Professor Williston, the Reporter for the Restatement of Con-
tracts, believed that full contract damages was the proper remedy 
under section 90.1° Finally, in the vast majority of cases in which the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel had previously been invoked, the 
relief granted was full enforcement of the promise.11 
Although adherence to full contract damages was a tenable posi-
tion, it evoked strong criticism because it prevented the extension of 
promissory estoppel to new, meritorious situations.12 The restric-
tion on the use of the doctrine can be demonstrated by adding a 
hypothetical element to the factual setting of the principal case: 
assume that in addition to the damages suffered in reliance ($3,000), 
the plaintiff could establish that had he executed a contract with 
the defendant, he would have received a one-year franchise and that 
his profits for that period would have been $20,000. Consider the 
position of the court faced with plaintiff's claim under section 90. 
If relief were measured by full contract damages-which attempt 
to put the promisee in the same financial position he would have 
been in had the promise been fulfilled-to sustain the plaintiff's 
cause of action would be to hold the defendant, who had neither 
exhibited bad faith nor become contractually bound, liable not 
merely for the $3,000 loss incurred through reliance, but for the lost 
profits of $20,000 as well.13 If the cause of action is dismissed, plain-
tiff's $3,000 damages would go uncompensated. This "all-or-nothing" 
approach, which necessarily follows from the use of full contract 
damages, understandably made the courts hesitant to apply section 
90 in such situations. 
In the principal case, however, the court departed from the 
theory of damages traditionally associated with section 90 and em-
ployed a theory of damages that would appear to make promissory 
estoppel useful in many situations not heretofore considered to be 
within its ambit. In lieu of full contract damages, the court, at-
tempting to return the promisee to his pre-promise status, awarded 
10. 4 ALI PROCEEDINGS app. 98-99 (1926). 
11. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been used primarily in the following 
settings: charitable subscriptions, parol promises to give land, gratuitous bailments, 
gratuitous agencies, bonus and pension plans, waivers, and rent reductions. Only in 
cases involving gratuitous bailments and agencies was the promiser held liable for 
the losses caused by reliance, rather than the value of his promised performance. 
See Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L. R.Ev. 908, 915-18 (1937). 
For a discussion of the application of promissory estoppel to the above areas see 
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedent, 50 MICH. L. R.Ev. 639 (1952). 
12. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 
U. PA. L. R.Ev. 459, 492-96 (1950); Fuller &: Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 420 (1936); Shattuck, supra note 11, at 941-45. This is not 
to suggest, however, that the Restatement misrepresented the existing state of the 
law. See R.EsTATEMENT, CoNTRACTS, Explanatory Notes § 90 (Off. Draft 1928). Rather, 
in attempting to correlate the diverse cases in which promissory estoppel had been 
employed, the Restatement unwittingly produced its deterrent effect. 
13. The award for lost profits would, of course, be mitigated by the projected 
amount of plaintiff's earnings for the year in a different position. 
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damages measured solely by plaintiff's reliance.14 This expanded use 
of section 90 is not based upon a new approach to reliance nor upon 
a sophisticated appreciation of "justice," but rather on the court's 
willingness to adapt the relief to the situation at hand and ignore 
the "all-or-nothing" approach previously read into section 90. As 
the Hoffman court aptly stated: 
Where damages are awarded in promissory estoppel instead 
of specifically enforcing the promisor's promise, they should be 
only such as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent in-
justice. Mechanical or rule of thumb approaches to the damage 
problem should be avoided.15 
Utilization of this flexible approach to damages would enable a 
court confronted with the example described above to employ 
section 90 to recompense the plaintiff for his reliance losses, while 
~bviating the necessity of granting future profits as well. 
The reliance damages approach advocated in the principal case 
parallels the approach taken in the Tentative Draft of the Restate-
ment of Contracts Second in which section 90 has been redefined16 
and explanatory comments have been added. As the Reporter's 
Note points out, the principal difference between the original Re-
statement and the Tentative Draft is the latter's recognition of 
"partial enforcement."17 In a discussion of this change, it is ex-
plained that the same factors which bear on the propriety of giving 
any relief, should also affect the nature of the relief. The Tentative 
Draft continues: "In particular, relief may sometimes be limited 
to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent 
of the promisee's reliance rather than by terms of the promise."18 
14. For a general discussion of reliance damages see Fuller&: Perdue, The Reliance 
Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 &: 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936). 
15. Principal case at 701, 133 N.W.2d at 276. 
16. R.EsrA.TEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) [hereinafter 
cited as Tentative Draft] provides: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does in-
duce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as 
justice requires. 
17. Tentative Draft § 90. It should be noted that the use of the phrase "partial 
enforcement" may perpetuate the misunderstanding surrounding the use of § 90. In 
awarding reliance damages, the terms of the promise are not important except in 
determining whether reliance was justified. To award less than full contract damages 
is not necessarily to partially enforce the terms of the promise. The promise is the 
foundation for an action based on § 90, but once shown, it is not thereafter con-
sidered in awarding damages-plaintiff's reliance, not the terms of defendant's 
promise, are the measure of recovery. To attempt to reconcile the recovery in the 
principal case with the ill-chosen language on the Tentative Draft, one would have 
to describe the award made to the plaintiff as the granting of a partial franchise-
defendant's promise having called for an entire franchise. 
18. Id. § 90, comment e at 170. (Emphasis added.) 
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The Tentative Draft also recognizes that the extent of reliance 
which is sufficient to serve as a basis for a cause of action for re-
covery may vary according to the type of situation involved. It sug-
gests, for example, that promissory estoppel need not be applied in 
the same fashion in charitable subscription cases, where only mini-
mal reliance is required and full contract damages are commonly 
awarded, and in situations like the principal case where more sub-
stantial reliance is requisite and reliance damages may fully com-
pensate the plaintiff.19 
In conjunction with the expanded use of promissory estoppel, 
there are several reasons why reliance damages should not be merely 
a possibility but should, in fact, be the favored form of relief with 
full contract damages the exception. First, the only basis for an 
estoppel action is the plaintiff's detrimental reliance, not his ex-
pectation of the promised performance. In other words, if the 
plaintiff in the principal case had not undergone a change of posi-
tion no cause of action would have arisen, despite identical conduct 
by the defendant. Second, since the comments to section 90 of the 
Tentative Draft explicitly state that the section is based on a re-
liance theory, an award measured by reliance would seem to be 
indicated.20 When a party is compensated for damages incurred 
through reasonable reliance, it would seem that, in theory, the 
action coincides with one founded in tort;21 the underlying ration-
ale is that plaintiff's financial injury is the foreseeable result of the 
defendant's representations. The same theory which operates in 
parallel tort cases, where damages are awarded to the extent of 
plaintiff's reliance on defendant's misrepresentations, should there-
fore be applicable in cases where the representations are made in 
the course of contract negotiations. Third, the equities in cases like 
the principal case do not warrant recovery in excess of reliance 
damages. The plaintiff could have insisted upon a binding bilateral 
19. Id. § 90, comment b at 166. The Tentative Draft also explicitly states that 
third parties are eligible for relief under § 90. Thus, in Hoffman, the court's decision to 
permit the husband and wife to recover as joint tenants of the bakery store is in 
accord with the theory of the Tentative Draft. 
20. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64: HARv. L. R.Ev. 
913, 926 (1951). But see Comment, 48 YALE L.J. 1036 (1939). 
21. See generally Kessler &: Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, 
and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. R.Ev. 401 (1964), which 
explains that the genesis of tort analogy in contract negotiation settings is found in 
a paper published by Jhering in 1861 which discusses the German law on this 
subject. The article further points out that an action to recover damages suffered 
through reliance upon representations made during contract negotiations is classified 
as contractual in Germany because there the negligent causing of pecuniary harm is 
not recognized as the basis of an action in tort. Although in this country the trend 
has been toward allowing the type of tort action that Germany does not recognize, 
a history of reluctance on the part of the American judiciary to entertain such 
actions might account for their continuing contractual categorization here. 
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agreement before he changed position; instead, he relied on repre-
sentations made by the defendant in the negotiation stage when 
neither he nor the defendant were contractually bound. Unlike the 
plaintiff in a true breach of contract case, the plaintiff here did not 
subject himself to any contractual liabilities and therefore he 
seems far less deserving of full contract damages. Finally, reliance 
damages are free from the punitive element which might inhere 
in the full contract damages approach. With reference again to the 
hypothetical example described above, it would indeed smack of 
inequity if a defendant who without bad faith had induced $3,000 
of reliance losses were held liable for $20,000 in full contract 
damages. 
While reliance damages should therefore generally be the measure 
of relief, the presence of certain factors might justify the award of 
full contract damages. Some of the factors that should be considered 
in ascertaining the appropriate relief in a particular situation are 
the disparity between the amounts of recovery under the respec-
tive remedies, the substantiality of the plaintiff's reliance, the rela-
tive bargaining strengths of the parties, and the reasonableness of 
the reliance in light of the custom and form of the particular com-
mercial setting. Professor Corbin goes so far as to recommend that 
[T]he relative economic needs and capacities of the parties and the 
needs and interests of the promisor's dependents and creditors 
should be taken into consideration, particularly in determining the 
form of the remedy and the extent of the relief.22 
Precedent seemingly exists £qr the award of full contract damages 
when bad faith on the part of the promisor is established. The im-
portance of this element is highlighted in a comment in the Tenta-
tive Draft, in which Goodman v. Dicker23 is contrasted with Chrys-
ler Corp. v. Quimby.24 In Goodman, the defendant mistakenly, but 
in good faith, advised plaintiff that he had been granted a fran-
chise to sell radios and that an initial delivery of at least thirty 
radios was forthcoming. Without referring to section 90, the 
court permitted recovery of the money expended by the plaintiff, 
but disallowed the plaintiff's claim for lost profits on the sale of 
thirty radios.25 On the other hand, in Chrysler, where the plaintiff 
was promised renewal of an automobile franchise if he purchased 
all the outstanding stock in the franchise, the plaintiff was awarded 
lost profits as well as his reliance expenses, that is, full contract 
22. IA CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 200, at 216-17 (1964 ed.); see Tentative Draft § 90, 
comment b. 
23. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
24. 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123, petition for reargument denied, 51 Del. 295, 144 A.2d 
885 (1958). 
25. Cf. Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1939); Burridge 
v. Ace Storm Window Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 184 (C.P. 1949). 
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damages, upon defendant's breach of his promise. While the two 
cases might appear inconsistent, a very real distinction exists; in 
Chrysler the promisor never intended to fulfill his promise, whereas 
in Goodman the element of deceit was lacking. Although Corbin 
makes no reference to the promisor's bad faith in his approbation 
of the Chrysler result,26 the Tentative Draft emphasizes the fact that 
the promisee was deliberately misinformed.27 Albeit Chrysler may 
not represent unassailable authority that full contract damages will 
necessarily follow a demonstration of bad faith; neither does it 
fortify the proposition that full contract damages are appropriate in 
good faith settings.28 
Even when reliance damages are granted, a problem might arise 
with respect to the amount of the award. In the principal case, it 
will be remembered, the plaintiff sought recovery of the future 
profits he allegedly lost on the sale of his grocery store. Such profits 
are not identical to those awarded in the Chrysler case, for in Chrys-
ler the profit was that which would have resulted had the defendant 
performed his promise, whereas in the principal case the grocery 
store profits were obviously unrelated to what the plaintiff would 
have realized had he acquired a Red Owl franchise. Since both 
parties in the principal case contemplated that the grocery store 
would be operated only on an interim basis, and that experience 
rather than profit was the motive, the court's decision to disallow 
future profits is seemingly correct. However, the court's allowance 
of recovery for the difference between the sales price and the market 
value of the store is questionable. Properly viewed, the purchase 
and sale of the store constitute a single transaction in preparation 
for the franchise. The consequence of the transaction was a net 
gain of $500 and, therefore, no loss was incurred. Indeed, it is 
arguable that the $500 should properly be deducted from plaintiff's 
final award.29 The purpose of reliance damages-to put the plain-
tiff in a position comparable to the one he would have been in had 
there been no promise-is not served by awarding the plaintiff 
the difference between the sales price and market value of the 
26. IA CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 205, at 248-49 (1964 ed.). 
27. Tentative Draft § 90, comment e, at 171. 
28. In 51 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1966), the commentator in explaining the court's 
unique application of § 90, stated that the court "apparently felt that Red Owl's 
negotiations had not been carried on in good faith." Id. at 356. That the plaintiff's 
reliance, not the defendant's state of mind, motivated the use of § 90 in Hoffman 
can be seen in the principal case where the court stated: 
Here, there is no evidence that would support a finding that Lukowitz (the 
Red Owl representative) made any of the promises, upon which plaintiff's claim 
is predicated, in bad faith with any present intent that they would not be fulfilled 
by Red Owl. 
Principal case at 695, 133 N.W .2d at 273. 
29. See 51 CORNELL L.Q. 351 n.l (1966). 
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grocery store any more than it would have been served by awarding 
him the future profits. 
This discussion is not meant to suggest that reliance damages 
need be measured solely by out-of-pocket expenditures. Assuming 
that the plaintiff in the principal case was induced to sell his bakery 
and spend two months without compensation in preparation for the 
franchise, a court, upon breach of the defendant's promise, would 
not be doing violence to the rationale underlying the theory of 
reliance damages in awarding the plaintiff the profits he would 
have realized from the bakery during this period. Likewise, had the 
plaintiff expended money in his preparations, he could properly 
be awarded interest on the sum.30 Both of the aforementioned 
awards would be consistent with the policy of the Tentative Draft 
that courts may modify the relief to the facts at hand. 
Because the principal case did not involve a gratuitous promise, 
but rather pre-contractual bargaining, it has been referred to as an 
unwarranted and unprecedented application of section 90.31 This 
criticism would appear to be unfounded for two reasons: (1) section 
90 has been employed in similar factual settings in the past;32 and 
(2) as suggested in the above discussion, section 90, as applied here, 
was a proper means of resolving the issue presented. It would seem 
that its novel approach to damages enabled the court to bring the 
principal case within the purview of section 90 and reach an equit-
able result. Although the above discussion has been limited to 
situations such as those in the principal case, it is suggested that, in 
light of the approach taken in that case and recommended by the 
Tentative Draft, courts are now presented with the opportunity to 
employ section 90 in many situations where full contract damages 
would have formerly precluded its use.33 
30. :Burridge v. Ace Storm Window Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 184: (C.P. 1949). 
31. 51 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1966). 
32. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Drennan 
v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 
Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123, petition for reargument denied, 51 Del. 295, 144 A.2d 885 (1958). 
33. Nothing in this article should be taken as discrediting the approach of those 
decisions in which the court recognized a cause of action based directly on a breach 
of promise and reliance, without resorting to general contract law or the Restatement 
§ 90. E.g., Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). In fact, such an approach 
is logically appealing in that it avoids the somewhat tenuous reasoning in the Tenta-
tive Draft, that is, that a promisee's reliance may give rise to a binding contract al-
though full contract damages might not be appropriate. In view of the strong im-
pact of the Restatement of Contracts, however, it is submitted that the Tentative 
Draft and Hoffman will allow expanded use of promissory estoppel by those courts 
which have paralleled their use of the doctrine to that suggested in the Restatement 
§ 90. 
